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THE FLORIDA HOMESTEAD LAW

OUR LEGAL CHAMELEON IS A SACRED COW: ALIENATION OF
HOMESTEAD UNDER THE 1968 CONSTITUTION
In Florida, homesteads are "sacred cows"; they may not be alienated
contrary to the interests of those to be protected by the homestead
character of the property involved .... I
Florida homestead law could be termed a trap for the unwary, 2 a blessing
for heirs and surviving spouses, 3 a curse to creditors and innocent third

party purchasers,4 and a source of endless litigation.5 Moreover, because
conveyances of homestead are among the most common transfers of real
property, homestead issues comprise a considerable amount of the real
property litigation in Florida. To add to the existing plethora of homestead

law, the 1968 Florida constitution 6 substantially changed the framework

regulating the conveyance of homestead.7 As a result, the new enactments

appear to have made previously resolved homestead issues again potentially
litigable 8 Judicially imposed restraints and their possible effect on the in-

1. Daniels v. Katz, 237 So. 2d 58, 60 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
2. For example, one would probably expect Fla. Stat. §689.11 (1969), amended by, Fla.
Laws 1971, ch. 71-54, at 156-57, which allows interspousal conveyance from one spouse to
himself and the other without the grantee-wife's joinder, to be applicable to homestead. But see Estep v. Herring, 154 Fla. 653, 654, 18 So. 2d 683, 684 (1944); Moore v.
Moore, 237 So. 2d 217, 220 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
1 3. For example, if the homesteader has a spouse or minor child the homestead is not
subject to devise. FLA. CONST. art. X, §4(c). In addition, if the homesteader is survived by
a spouse and lineal descendants the wife takes a life estate with the lineal descendants
taking a vested remainder. FLA. STAT. §731.27 (1969). Prior to enactment of §731.27 the
wife was allowed to take dower in the homestead. Church v. Lee, 102 Fla. 748, 136 So.

242 (1931).
4. Reed v. Fain, 145 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1962), where the court stated: "The Dunphe case
[Bigelow v. Dunphe, 143 Fla. 603, 197 So. 328 (1940)] demonstrates how difficult it is to
be an innocent third party when dealing with homestead property" Id. at 867 (emphasis
added). In Bigelow v. Dunphe a mortgagor took advantage of her own wrong to defeat
a foreclosure of the homestead.
5. For a lengthy discussion (seven appeals) involving the single question of whether a
married woman, who signed a mortgage involving homestead property but did not appear
before the notary taking the certificate of acknowledgment, was estopped to deny that she
had so appeared see Oates v. New York Life Ins. Co., 113 Fla. 678, 152 So. 671; 116 Fla. 253,
152 So. 672, rehearing denied, 117 Fla. 892 (1934); 122 Fla. 540, 166 So. 269 (1936); 122
Fla. 565, 166 So. 279 (1936); 130 Fla. 851, 178 So. 570 (1937); 141 Fla. 614, 192 So. 637
(1940); 144 Fla. 744, 198 So. 681' (1940), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 614 (1941).
6. FLA. CONST. art. X, §4.

7. Prior to the 1968 Florida constitution the homestead exemption was provided for
by FLA. CONSr. art. X, §§, 4 (1885); FLA. CONsr. art. IX (1868); Acts of March 15, 1843,
§1, pamph. 55, §2, pamph. 55 reprinted in THoMPSON's DIGFSr 356 (1847); Act of March
11, 1845, §1, pamph. 23, §2, pamph. 24, reprinted in THOMPSON'S DIGESr 357 (1847).
8. For example, although the Florida judiciary has imposed extraconstitutional restraints on the alienation of homestead such as the requirement of adequate consideration
for an intra-family conveyance and the grantee-wife's joinder in an interspousal conveyance,
the 1968 constitution appears to allow such trnasfers.
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terpretation of the new constitutional provisions present possible pitfalls
for the unwary. Moreover, recent legislative enactments manifesting the
legislature's own interpretation of the constitutional provisions further
complicate the problem. 9
This note will examine the basic nature of homestead, potential restraints
on inter vivos homestead alienation as they might arise under the new
constitution, and probable judicial constructions. Certain collateral restraints on inter vivos alienation will also be discussed, such as the transfer
of homestead property through a power of attorney, conveyance of homestead
by a mental incompetent, and the method by which a homestead tenancy
by the entirety may be created.
THE CONCEPT OF HOMESTEAD

The right or privilege known as the homestead estate did not exist at
common law.' 0 This estate is purely a statutory or constitutional creation
whose nature and extent is defined by law." The Florida constitution"
provides that a homestead to the extent of 160 acres, or one-half acre if
located within a municipality,"3 shall be exempt from forced sale if owned
by the head of a family.14 In addition, once a parcel of real estate is ascertained to be homestead"s other distinct concepts are associated with the
9. The statutes include: (1) authorization for an owner to convey homestead to his
spouse without her joinder, Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-54, at 156-57, amending Fla. Stat. §689.11
(1969); (2) conveyance of homestead real property by means of a power of attorney, Fla.
Laws 1971, ch. 71-27, at 95; and (3) the ratification of a homestead conveyance where one
spouse is incompetent and the guardian obtains the court's permission to join in the
conveyance with the same spouse. FLA. STAT. §745.15 (Supp. 1970).
10. E.g., Weller v. City of Phoenix, 39 Ariz. 148, 4 P.2d 665 (1931).
11. E.g., State v. Clayton, 162 Tenn. 368, 38 S.W.2d 551 (1931).
12. The homestead exemption provisions of the 1885 and 1968 constitutions are substantially similar. FLA. CONsT. art. X, §4(a) (1968); FLA. CONsT. art. X, §1 (1885). Two
changes, however, should be noted. The old constitution makes residency a prerequisite
to obtain the exemption whereas the new constitution omits this requirement. In addition,
the 1885 constitution allowed the homestead exemption for the owner's "residence and
business house" while the 1968 constitution limits the scope to his "residence."
13. Both the 1885 and 1968 constitutions indicate that the homestead exemption shall
not be reduced if the land is subsequently included within a municipality. FLA. CONST. art.
X, §4(a)(1) (1968); FLA. CONsT. art. X, §5 (1885).
14. A large body of law has arisen concerning the definition of the term "head of
a family." "The decisions, though numerous, disclose two basic tests, which may be met
together or in the alternative: (1) the legal duty to maintain arising out of the family
relationship at law, and (2) continuing communal living by at least two individuals under
such circumstances that one is recognized as the person in charge. Stated broadly, there
must be a family at law, or a family in fact, or both." Beck v. Wylie, 60 So. 2d 190, 191-92
(Fla. 1952), quoting from Crosby & Miller, Our Legal Chameleon, The Florida Homestead
Exemption, 2 U. FLA. L. REv. 12, 24-29 (1949). See also Comment, Homestead: Family
Headship, 7 U. FA. L. REv. 102 (1954). The family must consist of at least two people,
Whidden v. Abbott, 124 Fla. 293, 294-95, 168 So. 253, 254 (1936), but the head of the
family may be of either sex. E.g., Bigelow v. Dunphe, 143 Fla. 603, 197 So. 328,
rehearing denied, 144 Fla. 330, 198 So. 13 (1940).
15. This determination is based on the intent of the owner. E.g., Lanier v. Lanier,
95 Fla. 522, 116 So. 867 (1928); Semple v. Semple, 82 Fla. 138, 89 So. 638 (1921).
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estate, including restraints on inter vivos alienation, restraints on devise and
descent, and tax exemption.
Unlike the doctrines associated with homestead the right of an owner
to alienate property is not conferred by constitution or statute.16 Rather, it is
an inherent right incident to the ownership of property. 7 Therefore, in
the absence of restricting statutes, the family head should be able to convey
the homestead as if the property were non-homestead. 8
HoimsmTi PROVISIONS OF THE 1968 CONSTITUTION
Intra-Family Consideration Requirement
Although the 1885 constitution did not contain an express consideration
requirement for intra-family conveyance of homestead,' 9 the Florida supreme
court judicially imposed such a restriction. This requirement arose out of
a misinterpretation of article X, section 2 of the 1885 Florida constitution,
which stated: "The exemptions provided for in section one [as to forced
sale] shall inure to the widow and heirs of the party entitled to such exemption."20 Instead of correctly interpreting this section to mean that the
homestead was exempt in the hands of the heirs from levy for the deceased
homesteader's debts,2 1 the Florida supreme court held that the potential
heirs of a homesteader received an interest in the homestead. Because of this
interest a homesteader could alienate the homestead only in compliance
with the constitution.22 Such an interpretation apparently arose because of a

16.
17.
18.
19.

Hinson v. Booth, 39 Fla. 333, 340, 22 So. 687, 692 (1897).
Thomas v. Craft, 55 Fla. 842, 46 So. 594 (1908).
Hinson v. Booth, 39 Fla. 333, 340, 22 So. 687, 692 (1897).
FLA. CoNsr. art. X, §4 (1885) provided: "Nothing in this Article shall be construed

to prevent the holder of a homestead from alienating his or her homestead so exempted
by deed or mortgage duly executed by himself or herself, and by husband and wife, if
"
such relation exists ....
20. FLA. CONsr. art. X, §2 (1885). For a detailed discussion of the evolution of the
consideration requirement see Buchwald, Florida Homestead: A Restraint on Alienation
by Judicial Accretion, 19 U. MLiMI L. REv. 114, 121-34 (1964). See also Crosby & Miller,
supra note 14, at 70-77; Shapo, Restraints on Alienation and Devise of Homestead: Monsters
Unfettered from Florida's Past, 19 U. MiAmi L. Rxv. 72, 87-95, 102-110 (1964).
21. This was the interpretation by two early Florida supreme court decisions. In
Godwin v. King, 31 Fla. 525, 13 So. 108 (1893), the main question was whether the homestead provisions of the constitution removed the widow's dower right in lands owned by
her former husband. After deciding that homestead was subject to dower, the court rejected a contention that article X, section 2 required the homestead to inure to the heirs
without being subject to the widow's dower right. The court said the purpose of the
constitutional exemption was to relieve the homestead from the debts of the owner both
in his and his heirs' hands. In addition, the exemption is all that inures to the heirs
upon the owner's death; neither the 1868 nor the 1885 Florida constitutions provided for
the descent of the homestead. Accord, Hinson v. Booth, 39 Fla. 333, 22 So. 687 (1897), where
the heirs contended that the property passed to them by reason of article X, section 2,
rather than through the will. Once again, the court stressed that only the exemption
inures to the widow and heirs by reason of the constitution and concluded that no reasonable construction of the constitution would give title to the widow or heirs.
22. Hutchinson v. Stone, 79 Fla. 157, 84 So. 151 (1920), where a mortgagee sought to
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confusion of the constitutional exemption from forced sale and the descent
of homestead provided for by statute.23 The court reasoned that to allow a

voluntary intra-family conveyance would be to allow the homestead to lose
25
its status, 24 and thus the interest of the potential heirs would be defeated.

However, if the conveyance was for consideration, the consideration would
28
take the place of the exempted property.
Voluntary intra-family conveyances of the type prohibited involved
transfers from the husband as owner to his wife,27 to himself and his wife as
tenants by the entirety, -8 or to his children.2 9 Although early courts held
foreclose a lien on homestead property. Although an acknowledgment had been taken over
the phone subsequent to the wife's execution of the mortgage, the defense was based
on the lack of acknowledgment to the wife's signature. Instead of finding a waiver or
estoppel the court found that the mortgage was not "duly executed" with the "joint
consent" of both husband and wife. Instead of relying exclusively on the constitutional
requirements, the court declared that the homestead exempt property was for the benefit
of the heirs as well as for the benefit of the widow: "The 'heirs' of the homestead owner,
as well as the owner and his wife, if he has one, have an interest that can be 'alienated'
only as provided in the Constitution." Id. at 165, 84 So. at 154 (emphasis added). Hutchinson is a landmark decision not for its holding that a homestead deed must be separately
acknowledged by the wife, but rather for the statement that the heirs of the homesteader
have an interest protected by the constitution. For more than five decades the Florida
courts have attempted to define this special interest. The quagmire of decisions is so irreconcilable that the Florida supreme court had difficulty defining the heir's interest. See
Reed v. Fain, 145 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1961), where the court said the interest was "actual as
distinguished from imaginary . . . . It is incipient, dependent and contingent, yet genuine.
It is created and protected by our Constitution." Id. at 868. A concurrent federal decision
is not in complete agreement. See Weitzner v. United States, 309 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1962),
where the court called the interest "remote, uncertain and a mere expectancy or possibility and not a vested property right, interest or title." Id. at 48.
23. FLA. STAT. §731.27 (1969) provides that if the homesteader dies survived by a
widow and lineal descendants, the wife takes a life estate in the homestead and the lineal
descendants take a remainder.
24. This reasoning is based on the proposition that when a homestead is no longer
owned by the head of a family, as where a husband conveys to his wife or children, the
property is not entitled to an exemption from forced sale. See note 14 and accompanying
text supra.
25. See Norton v. Baya, 88 Fla. 1, 102 So. 361 (1924), where the husband, joined by
the wife, voluntarily conveyed through a strawman to the wife alone. The court stated that
when children exist such a deed is invalid because: "If given effect it would operate to
transfer the legal title to the homestead from the husband to the wife, stripped of its
homestead status or character, thereby converting her interest therein into absolute ownership, and divest his 'children,' who are his prospective 'heirs,' of the interest which, under
the Constitution, inures to them." Id. at 6, 102 So. at 363.
26. Norman v. Kannon, 133 Fla. 710, 182 So. 903 (1938). To justify the requirement of
consideration for a conveyance by the owner to himself and his wife as tenants by the
entirety, the court stated: "If a permissible conveyance of a homestead for a proper consideration is duly made, the consideration takes the place of the exempted property and
the Constitution may not thereby be violated. Such conveyances of homesteads serve the
public policy of a limited exercise of the natural right of alienation and preserves the
organic homestead exemption for protection of the family." Id. at 716, 182 So. at 905.
27. Jackson v. Jackson, 90 Fla. 563, 107 So. 255 (1925).
28. Norman v. Kannon, 133 Fla. 710, 182 So. 903 (1938).
29. See Daniels v. Mercer, 105 Fla. 362, 364, 141 So. 189, 190 (1932) (dictum), where
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that consideration was a requirement only when children existed because
they were holders of a "vested" interest, 0 later courts held the existence of
children to be immaterial in regard to constitutional requirements 31 and
2
rejected the idea that the children's interests were vested3
Rather than leave the 1968 constitution open to similar judicial interpretation, the framers of the document specifically expressed their intent with
respect to such requirements. The new constitution allows a gratuitous transfer of the homestead regardless of the grantee's status.33 Presumably, since
no reference is made to the existence of children, this factor was not intended to impose a limitation on the provision.3 4 This conclusion is supported
by: (1) the Florida supreme court's indication that under the 1885 constitution the existence of children was immaterial as to whether the requirement of consideration should be imposed in an intra-family conveyance, 35
and (2) the court's rejection of the idea that the homesteader's children
obtained a vested interest in the homestead. 36

the court found valuable consideration and held such a deed from the homesteader to his
children permissible under the 1885 constitution.
30. E.g., Church v. Lee, 102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931).
31. Scoville v. Scoville, 40 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1949). The constitution places only one
limitation on the inter vivos alienation of homestead, namely: joint consent and due execution by both husband and wife are needed. Id. at 842.
32. Reed v. Fain, 145 So. 2d 858, 868 (Fa. 1961), aff'g 122 So. 2d 322 (2d D.C.A. Fla.

1960).
33. FLA. CONsT. art. X, §4 (c) provides in part: "The owner of homestead real estate...
may alienate the homestead by mortgage, sale, or gift .... "
34. In addition the section provides: "The homestead shall not be subject to devise
if the owner is survived by spouse or minor child." (Emphasis added.) This restraint is
somewhat differed from the prohibition under the 1885 constitution of a devise of the
homestead if the owner had children of any age. FLA. CONsT. art. X, §4 (1885). FLA. STAT.
§781.05 (1) (1969) provides that the homestead may not be devised if the owner "leaves
either a widow or lineal descendants." Obviously, there is some incongruity between the
statute and the constitution. The constitution indicates that the homestead may not be
devised where the owner leaves a "spouse," while the statue indicates "widow." The
statute has been interpreted to be limited to a female survivor, so it is not as broad as
the constitution and thus not invalid. The constitution also indicates that the homestead
may not be devised if the owner is survived by a "minor child." Certainly the category of
"lineal descendants" is broader than the constitutional "minor child" provision. Thus, in
In re Estate of McGinty, 258 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1971), the court held FLA. STAT. §791.05 (1)
(1969) unconstitutional because the statute allowed a devise of homestead where a widower
was survived by children who had reached their majority. The court stated: "The restraint
on the right of an individual to devise his property at death should not be extended
beyond that expressly allowed by the Constitution." Id. at 451. For a background on the
choice of the words "spouse or minor child" see 68 FLORIDA CONsTrruTIONAL REVISiON
COMMISSION HEARiNGS 136-72. Accordingly, statutory amendments are recommended in Appendix B of this note to reconcile the statutory and constitutional provisions. This provision has been recommended to the Florida Legislature by the Florida Law Revision
Commission. See FLORIDA LAw REVISION COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT AND REcOMMENDATIONS 55-57 (1970-1971) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSON REPORT].
85. Scoville v. Scoville, 40 So. 2d 840, 842 (Fla. 1949).
36. Reed v. Fain, 145 So. 2d 858, 868 (Fla. 1961), afg 122 So. 2d 322 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1960). Furthermore, authorities on Florida real estate transactions concur with this in-
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The new constitution corrects an anomaly that existed for several decades
as a part of the substantive law of Florida. Under the old constitution, an
owner of homestead property could convey to another family member only
for valuable consideration. The restrictions against intra-family gratuitous
conveyances, however, could be avoided by the use of very simple devises.
37
Consideration was never required in voluntary conveyances to third parties
or to transfers of non-homestead property. 38 Thus, where the owner wished
to convey the property to a family member he could either convey through a
strawman 39 or abandon the property, allowing it to lose its homestead status,
and then alienate the property free from judicial restriction. 40 By allowing
gratuitous intra-family conveyances the new constitution enhances the marketability and stability of Florida land titles.
Interspousal Joinder Requirement
The new constitution contains substantial changes regarding the joinder
of husband and wife in transferring their homestead. The 1885 constitution's requirements of "joint consent of husband and wife" 41 and that
the "deed or mortgage [be] duly executed by himself or herself, and by
husband and wife" 42 do not appear in the new constitution. The 1968
constitution simply requires that the owner of the homestead be "joined
by the spouse if married."' 43 While it is clear that both must join in a con-

terpretation of the new constitution. E.g., I R. BoYR, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACrIONS
§21.03, at 474.13 (1969): "Thus, as to all homestead conveyances and mortgages occurring
after the effective date of this Constitution, there should be no basis for declaring the
transaction void simply for lack of consideration."
37. Denham v. Sexton, 48 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1950) (dictum).
38. E.g., Jordan v. Jordan, 100 Fla. 1586, 132 So. 466 (1931), where the court validated a conveyance from the husband to himself and his wife after the land had lost
its homestead status. Cf. Gulf Refining v. Ankeny, 102 Fla. 151, 135 So. 521 (1931).
39. Denham v. Sexton, 48 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1950) (dictum).
40. The contention that this anomaly should allow a gratuitous transfer of the homestead has been rejected. Jackson v. Jackson, 90 Fla. 563, 107 So. 255 (1925); Norton v.
Baya, 88 Fla. 1, 102 So. 361 (1924); Crosby & Miller, supra note 14, at 37-40.
41. FLA. CONsT. art. X, §1 (1885). A deed that is executed as the result of fraud is
obviously not obtained with "joint consent." Lightsey v. Butts, 89 Fla. 185, 104 So. 852
(1925).
42. FLA. CONST. art. X, §4 (1885). A deed that is executed by only one spouse is not
"duly executed." Bigelow v. Dunphe, 144 Fla. 330, 198 So. 13 (1940); O'Neal v. Miller, 143
Fla. 171, 196 So. 478 (1940); Jones v. Federal Farm Mortgage Corp., 138 Fla. 65, 188 So.
804 (1939); Comment, Alienation of Homestead: Married Women, 15 FLA. B.J. 67 (1941).
43. FLA. CoNsr. art. X, §4 (c). In addition, all the requisite formalities of the Statute
of Frauds must be followed. FLA. STAT. §689.01 (1969) provides: "No estate or interest of
freehold or for a term of more than one year, or any uncertain interest of, in or out of
any messuages, lands, tenements, or hereditaments shall be created, made, granted, transferred or released in any other manner than by instrument in writing signed in the
presence of two subscribing witnesses by the party creating, making, granting, conveying,
transferring or releasing such estate, interest, or term of more than one year .... ." For
cases concerning the necessity of two subscribing witnesses see, e.g., Heath v. First Nat'l
Bank, 213 So. 2d 833 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1968); Hamilton v. Corcoron, 177 So. 2d 64 (2d
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veyance of a homestead owned by one spouse to a third party, the difficult
question remains whether the grantee-spouse must join in an interspousal
conveyance.
Interspousal transfers commonly take two forms. The husband conveys
his fee simple title either to the wife in fee simple or to himself and his
wife as tenants by the entirety. The 1968 constitution provides:The owner of homestead real estate, joined by the spouse if married,
may alienate the homestead by mortgage, sale or gift and, if married,
may by deed transfer the title to an estate by the entirety with the
spouse.
The section's meaning is unclear, but it seems to convey two separate
thoughts: (1) the owner of homestead real estate, joined by the spouse if
married, may alienate and (2) the owner of homestead real estate, if married,
may by deed transfer the title to an estate by the entirety with the spouse.
This interpretation appears to eliminate the requirement of joinder
in a transfer by the owner of the homestead to himself and his wife as
tenants by the entirety. Assuming this interpretation is adopted by the
courts, the question remains whether an interspousal fee simple conveyance
by one spouse to the other requires the grantee-wife's joinder. Although
one Florida authority has taken the position that the wife's joinder is
required in any conveyance, 45 others argue that the constitutional provision
46
is unclear.
In 1941 the Florida Legislature, apparently desiring to determine the
necessity of the grantee-spouse's joinder in an interspousal conveyance,
passed section 689.11 of the Florida Statutes, which provides that the
grantee-spouse need not join in such conveyance. 47 This statute, however,
has been consistently held inapplicable to homestead property.48 Recog-

b.C.A. Fla. 1965). But see Harris v. Dikman, 235 So. 2d 529 (2d D.G.A. Fla. 1970). See also
Commentary, Contracts for the Sale of Land: Subscribing Witnesses?, 24 U. FLA. L. Rv.
155 (1971).
44. FLA. CONsr.art. X, §4 (c).

45. 1 R. BoxaR, supra note 36, §20.02, at 446: "Further, the constitution [1968] requires
the joinder of both husband and wife, when that relation exists, in any conveyance of the
homestead."
46. 3 LAwYExs' TrrLE

GUATANTY FUND, CONCEPT 31 (1971). CoMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 34, at 40 indicates: "Possibly the new constitution will be interpreted as still requiring

the joinder in an interspousal transfer of homestead realty. But it appears to be susceptible

of a different interpretation, which would eliminate the necessity for such joinder."
47. Fla. Laws 1941, ch. 20954, §6, at 2506. Fla. Stat. §689.11 (1) (1969), as amended,
Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-54, at 156-57, contained substantially the same wording as the
original act: "A conveyance of real estate, made by a husband direct to his wife, or by a
wife direct to her husband, shall be effectual to convey the legal title to such wife, or
husband, as the case may be, in all cases in which it would be effectual if the parties were

not married, and the grantee need not join in the execution of such conveyances."
48. The rationale being that the 1885 constitution required such a deed to be "duly
executed" by husband and wife. E.g., Estep v. Herring, 154 Fla. 653, 654, 18 So. 2d 683,
684 (1944); Moore v. Moore, 237 So. 2d 217, 220 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970); Moorefield v.
Byrne, 140 So. 2d 876, 877 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962). Contra, where homestead is owned by
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nizing this ambiguity in the new constitution and wishing to express its
intent as to its proper interpretation, the 1971 Florida legislature amended
section 689.11 to include homestead. 49 Under the statute the grantee-spouse
need not join with the grantor in a conveyance of homestead to her either
in fee simple or as tenant by the entirety.
The essential question is the statute's constitutionality.o Such a determination requires an examination of the joinder provisions under the
1885 constitution, their construction, the reasons for such construction, and
the validity of those reasons. When the issue was first presented, the
Florida supreme court strictly construed the constitution to require the wife's
joinder in an interspousal conveyance to herself. 5' Later decisions reasoned
that to permit a conveyance of the homestead by the husband alone would
allow the homesteader to deprive the children of their "interest" without
the wife's consent.5 2 The court misconstrued article X, section 2, which
provided that the homestead exemption shall inure to the heirs, to mean
the homestead property itself shall inure to the heirs.53 This "interest"
evolved from a confusion of the constitutionally provided homestead exemption with the statutory descent of homestead .4
At one point the interest was considered vested55 but a later decision
reduced the interest to a mere expectancy. 6 Thus, the later theory under
which the grantee-spouse's joinder was required, evolved out of an erroneous
interpretation of the constitution. The theory that the child has a vested
interest should, therefore, be rejected if raised in a case attacking the constitutionality of section 689.11.
husband and wife by the entirety and a conveyance is made directly to the wife. Hunt v.
Covington, 145 Fla. 706, 200 So. 76 (1941); LAWYERS' TITLE GUARANTY FUND, TrrLE NoTEs
63-57 (1957).
49. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-54, at 156-57, amending Fla. Stat. §689.11 (1969). The portion
pertaining to the grantee's joinder in an interspousal transfer provides: "A Conveyance
of real estate, including homestead, made by one spouse to the other shall convey the legal
title to the grantee spouse in all cases in which it would be effectual if the parties were
not married, and the grantee need not execute the conveyance." COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 34, at 40. "Accordingly, the following bill is recommended [Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-54]
so as to express the legislative intent that the constitution be interpreted to permit interspousal transfers of homestead realty without joinder."
50. Lawyers' Title Guaranty Fund takes an understandably conservative position:
"Possibly the new constitution will be interpreted as set out in Chapter 71-54, Laws of
Florida. However, until so interpreted by the Supreme Court of Florida, The Fund's
position remains that joinder of the grantee spouse should be required in interspousal
conveyances of homestead real property." 3 LAWYERS' TITLE GUARANTY FUND, CONCEPT 31
(1971).
51. Thomas v. Craft, 55 Fla. 842, 36 So. 594 (1908). For a detailed discussion of the
history surrounding the joinder requirement for interspousal conveyances of homestead
see authorities cited note 20 supra.
52. E.g., Hutchinson v. Stone, 79 Fla. 157, 84 So. 151 (1920).
53. E.g., Norton v. Baya, 88 Fla. 1, 102 So. 361 (1924).
54. See text accompanying notes 20-32 supra.
55. Church v. Lee, 102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931).
56. Reed v. Fain, 145 So. 2d 858, 868 (Fla. 1961), afl'g 122 So. 2d 322 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1960).
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Furthermore, in Rawling v. Dade Lumber Co.5 the Florida supreme
court apparently abandoned its initial basis for requiring the wife's joinder.
The court allowed a transfer of homestead, executed by the husband alone,
to the wife in fee simple because of the absence of children in esse.58 If there
had been children the homestead could not have been conveyed contrary to
their "interest."59 If the court had followed its earlier decisions strictly interpreting the constitution, it would have invalidated this conveyance despite
the absence of children.
After judicial rejection of the notion that children have a vested interest
in the homestead, 60 the existence or nonexistence of children should not
lead to different results. Thus, even where children exist an interspousal
transfer of the homestead should not require the joinder of the grantee.
In addition, the decision of Church v. Lee6' strengthened the argument that
the wife should not be required to join in a conveyance of the homestead
to herself. Church held that the constitutional limitations on the alienation
of homestead were "only intended to apply to bona fide alienations of the
homestead to third parties . . . and not to transfers made directly or indirectly to the wife . ...
62 The court concluded that "to require the wife
to unite in executing a conveyance to herself would be 'to demand the performance of an absurd and idle act.' "63
Still another principle indicates that the grantee-spouse need not join
in a deed to herself. In Hunt v. Covington 64 a husband transferred his
one-half undivided interest in an estate by the entirety to his wife. Notwithstanding the wife's failure to join, the court held the conveyance valid
because "by the acceptance of the conveyance the wife manifests her consent
to the transfer .
*.".."65 When the grantee's joinder requirement is approached from a practical standpoint it seems absurd to require a spouse
to execute a conveyance that is beneficial only to herself. As the court said:
"Logic and reason supports the conclusion enunciated."66
Although these decisions arose under the old constitution, changes in
the specific language of the joinder provisions do not appear significant. The
old constitution required the deed to be "duly executed by . . . husband
and wife, if such relation exists"6 7 and the new constitution requires the
owner to be "joined by the spouse if married." 68

57.
58.
59.
60.

80 FIa. 398, 86 So. 334
Id. at 403-04, 86 So. at
See text accompanying
Reed v. Fain, 145 So.

(1920).
336.
notes 21-22 supra.
2d 858, 868 (Fla. 1961), afl'g 122 So. 2d 322 (2d D.CA. Fla.

1960). See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
61. 102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931).
62. Id. at 489, 136 So. at 247.
63.

Id.

64. 145 Fla. 706, 200 So. 76 (1941).
65. Id. at 707, 200 So. at 77.
66.

Id.

67. FLA. CONST. art. X, §4 (1885).
68. FLA. CONsr. art. X, §4 (c).
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Logically, the grantee-spouse of an interspousal homestead transfer should
not be required to join the conveyance, and this result has been reached
in most other states.6 9 Although the new constitution is subject to various
interpretations, adequate authority exists to support a result dictated by
common sense and reason.
Power of Attorney
When either spouse or both cannot be physically present to join in the
execution of a deed a power of attorney may be utilized to accomplish the
execution. However, the question arises whether a deed of homestead real
estate may be conveyed by means of a power of attorney. Although there is
no express constitutional, statutory, or case law prohibition in Florida
barring the use of a power of attorney,7 0 there has been a general reluctance
71
on the part of title insurers and real estate attorneys to accept such a deed.
From a practical standpoint, such an attitude has placed many servicemen
and elderly people in a difficult position.72

69. See, e.g., Turner v. Bernheimer, 95 Ala. 241, 10 So. 750 (1891); Lahrs v. Hancock,
6 Ariz. 340, 57 P. 605 (1899); Kindley v. Spraker, 72 Ark. 228, 79 S.W. 776 (1904); Grupe v.
Byers, 73 Cal. 271, 14 P. 863 (1887); Browning v. Barber, 154 Ga. 221, 113 S.E. 797 (1922);
Schroeder v. Ginn, 310 Ill. 271, 141 N.E. 716 (1923); Hayes v. Dean, 182 Iowa 619, 164
N.W. 770 (1917); Lynch v. Doran, 95 Mich. 395, 54 N.W. 882 (1893); Williams v. Green,
128 Miss. 446, 91 So. 39 (1922); Bank of Bladen v. David, 53 Neb. 608, 74 N.W. 42 (1898);
Wehe v. Wehe, 44 N.D. 280, 175 N.W. 366 (1919); Hall v. Powell, 8 Okla. 276, 57 P. 168
(1899); Mitchell v. Denny, 129 Tenn. 366, 164 S.W. 1140 (1914); McGovern v. Woolley, 200
S.W. 271 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918); Russ v. King, 141 Va. 335, 127 S.E. 100 (1925). Contra,
Kitterlin v. Milwaukee Mechanics Mut. Ins. Co., 134 Ill. 647, 25 N.E. 772, rev'g 24 Ill. App.
188 (1887). In 1919 the Illinois homestead laws were amended (similar to the 1941
amendment to §689.11) to eliminate the requirement of joinder in interspousal conveyances. But see In re Geary, 146 Cal. 105, 79 P. 855 (1905).
70. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 34, at 1; LAWYERS' TITLE GUARANTY FUND, TrrLE
NOTES 193-58 (1958). Knowlton v. Dean, 159 Fla. 98, 31 So. 2d 58 (1947), is the
only reported Florida decision considering whether homestead may be conveyed by use of
a power of attorney. In that case, husband and wife owned homestead property as tenants
by the entirety and the husband gave his wife a power of attorney that expressly allowed
her to dispose of his entire interest in the estate. Subsequently, the husband disappeared
and did not return. After moving out of the house, the wife rented the residence and
later executed a contract to sell the property on behalf of herself and her husband. When
the buyer refused to complete the transaction the wife sought a decree of specific performance and the vendee defended on the basis that a parcel of homestead could not be
conveyed by means of a power of attorney. Without considering the validity of the contract if the property had retained its homestead status, the court held that the property
had lost its homestead status and the contract was valid. See Comment, Homestead: Conveyance by One Spouse Joined by Himself as Attorney In Fact for the Other Spouse, I U. FLA.
L. REv. 108 (1948).
71. COMMIssION REPORT, supra note 34, at 1; LAWYERS' TITLE GUARANTY FUND, TITLE
NOTES 505-64 (1964).
72. Obviously, when no one will accept a deed executed by means of a power of
attorney and title insurance companies will not insure such a transaction, it makes little
difference from a practical standpoint whether the law prohibits such a conveyance.
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Since 1943 section 708.09 of the Florida Statutes has expressly authorized
a married woman to give her husband powers of attorney and to receive
such powers from him73 These powers include power to convey property
owned by either spouse alone or by the husband and wife jointly74 However,
the statute contains a proviso that states: 75 "This law shall not be construed
as: (5) Dispensing with the joinder of husband and wife in conveying or
mortgaging homestead property." Undoubtedly, the existence of this provision is one of the reasons a conveyance of homestead by a power of attorney is considered invalid.7 6 The clause, however, refers to joinder, not
physical joinder. Mere "joinder" may be accomplished where one spouse
executes the deed for himself and then for his wife if he has been given a
power of attorney, whereas "physical joinder" would require both husband
and wife to actually execute the deed. If the clause refers to "joinder" only,
then the proviso is mere surplusage because the 1885 constitution required
this type of execution77 Obviously a statute could never be construed as
dispensing with a constitutional requirement.
The language of the 1885 constitution requiring due execution by "himself or herself"8 played an additional role in generating the presumption
that a power of attorney was not effective to convey homestead because the
language inferred actual physical joinder of both husband and wife.79
To remove the existing widespread doubt as to the validity of homestead
transfers by means of a power of attorney, the 1971 Florida Legislature
passed a law specifically allowing such a conveyance.80 It was felt that homestead should not, for public policy reasons, be treated differently from nonhomestead with respect to powers of attorney."' The statute allows a deed
or mortgage of homestead realty to be executed with a power of attorney,
irrespective of whether the owner is married or single, whether the homestead is owned in fee simple or by husband and wife as tenants by the

73. FLA. STAT. §708.09 (Supp. 1970): "Every married woman may enter into agreements
and contracts with her husband, may become the partner of her husband or others, may
give a power of attorney to her husband, and may execute powers conferred upon her by
her husband, including the power to execute and acknowledge deeds to property owned
by her or by herself and her husband as tenants by the entirety or by her husband. All
powers of attorney heretofore executed by a wife to her husband and vice versa, and
the execution of all documents executed thereunder, are hereby validated and confirmed."
74. Id.
75. FLA. STAT. §708.10(5) (1969). A note following §708.10 in the 1969 Florida Statutes
indicates: "Subsection (5) was rendered obsolete by §5, Art. X of the constitution as revised in 1968. It will be repealed by a subsequent revisers bill." This note is erroneous.
Correspondence with the revisor indicates that the note was inserted by mistake. Letter
from Ernest E. Means, Aug. 17, 1971.
76. See notes 70-71 supra.
77. FLA. CONsr. art. X, §§1, 4 (1885).
78. FLA. CONsr.art. X, §4 (1885).
79. LAwYERs' TrrLE GUARANTY FUND, TITLE NomS 505-64 (1964).
80. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-27, at 95.
81. CossiSSoN REPORT, supra note 34, at 1-3.
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entirety, and whether the deed is executed by virtue of a power of attorney
to a third person or to the other spouse.82
The constitutional validity of the power of attorney statute may be
questioned in light of article X, section 4 (c) of the 1968 Florida constitution.83 Under the old constitution a deed of homestead must be "duly
executed by himself or herself, and by husband and wife, if such relation
exists."84 This seemed to indicate a requirement of physical joinder. 5 The
new constitution, however, contains no such language for it states that the
owner must be "joined by the spouse if married."8' 6 Arguably, joinder may
be accomplished through an agent or attorney-in-fact. 87 This is precisely
what the new statute provides: 8
Nothing in this section shall be construed as dispensing with the requirement that husband and wife join in the conveyance or mortgage
of homestead realty, but the joinder may be accomplished through the
exercise of a power of attorney.
Florida is a state in which many servicemen and their families reside.
Many of these individuals are away from their homes for extended periods
of time. Frequently, it is necessary for the serviceman to execute a power
of attorney in favor of his spouse or a third person in order that his home
may be conveyed pursuant to a contract for sale or in the face of unexpected
circumstances. For this reason alone, public policy demands that this statute
be held constitutional.89

82. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-27, at 95 provides: "(1)

A deed or mortgage of homestead

realty owned by an unmarried person may be executed by virtue of a power of attorney,
executed in the same manner as a deed. (2) A deed or mortgage of homestead realty owned
by a married person, or owned as an estate by the entirety, may be executed by virtue of
a power of attorney executed solely by one spouse to the other, or solely by one spouse or
both spouses to a third party, provided the power of attorney is executed in the same
manner as a deed. Nothing in this section shall be construed as dispensing with the requirement that husband and wife join in the conveyance or mortgage of homestead realty,
but the joinder may be accomplished through the exercise of a power of attorney." In
addition, the statute provides a power of attorney must be executed in the same manner

as a deed.
deed.
83.
84.

FLA.

STAT. §689.01 (1969) delineates the executional formalities required for a

3 LAwYERs' TrrLE GUARANTY FUND, CONcEPT 33
FLA. CONsT. art. X, §4 (1885).

(1971).

85. See text accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
86. FLA. CONsr. art. X, §4 (c).
87. See note 82 supra.
88. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-27, §2, at 95.
89. Only a handful of other states have considered the question of whether a transfer
of homestead by means of a power of attorney is a valid conveyance. California considered
the question in Gagliardo v. Dumont, 54 Cal. 496 (1880), where the husband, as owner of
the homestead, executed a power of attorney to a third person. The attorney then joined

with the wife in a conveyance to another party. In holding the deed and power of
attorney invalid, the court reasoned that a conveyance of the homestead by one spouse would
be invalid so "it would seem to follow that a power of attorney made by the husband to
convey it would be also invalid .... ." Id. at 499-50. This logic seems tenuous because a
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In addition, considerable difficulty has arisen where the serviceman becomes "missing" or "missing in action."' 0 In many of these cases Florida is
not actually "home." Rather, the serviceman and his wife have been stationed
in Florida and have purchased a residence pending a transfer or discharge.
When the husband becomes missing the wife normally desires to leave Florida
and return to her former residence. Without a convenient scheme by which
she can transfer title to the home, considerable delay and expense await
her.
Pursuant to this problem the 1970 Florida Legislature enacted section
709.015 of the Florida Statutes.91 The statute provides that once the principal
is in a "missing" status the acts of an agent, acting under a power of attorney,
shall be as binding as if the principal were alive and competent. 92 In addition: "Homestead property held as tenants by the entireties shall not be
conveyed by a power of attorney regulated by this section until one year

power of attorney grants no rights in the homestead and thus should not be subject to the
restraints imposed on a transfer of such property. The same result, under a different
rationale, was reached by the Kansas supreme court in Wallace v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 54
Kan. 442, 38 P. 489 (1894), where the court held that a power of attorney executed by the
wife did not meet the constitutional requirement of joint consent. Here the court construed joint consent to mean concurrent personal consent. Accord, Minnesota Stoneware
Co. v. McCrossen, 110 Wis. 316, 85 N.W. 1019 (1901), where the wife executed a power of
attorney in favor of her husband. Subsequently the husband, joined by himself as an
attorney-in-fact for his wife, mortgaged their homestead to a third person. The court found
the mortgage invalid because the power of attorney was to sell and convey, a limitation
that the court said did not include the power to mortgage. In Oregon Mortgage Co. v.
Heraner, 14 Wash. 515, 45 P. 40 (1896), the court approached the issue more liberally and
allowed a transfer of homestead by a power of attorney. Washington statutes contained a
provision that allowed powers of attorney from one spouse to the other. In rejecting
Gagliardo and Wallace, the court held that if the laws requiring joint consent were to
be given this interpretation, the power of attorney statute would be rendered useless. If
the legislature has intended to exclude homestead from the statute, said the court, it would
have so indicated. Texas upheld such a transfer in Warren v. Jones, 69 Tex. 462, 6 S.W.
7775 (1888). In validating a transfer of homestead by virtue of a power of attorney, the
court relied primarily on a prior Texas decision that allowed a conveyance of a married
woman's separate property by the use of a power of attorney. Accord, Jones v. Robbins, 74
Tex. 615, 12 S.W. 824 (1889).
90. TimE, Nov. 1, 1971, at 98. See 5 U.S.C. §5561 (1970); 37 U.S.C. §551 (1970) (defining "missing" status).
91. FLA. STAT. §709.015 (Supp. 1970). In addition, the 1971 Florida Legislature provided
an alternative method for homestead conveyance where one spouse is missing in action.
Section 745.01 of the Florida Statutes has been amended to provide: "An 'absentee' as defined in this act is considered incompetent for purposes of section 4, Article X, Florida
Constitution." Fla. Stat. §747.01 (1969), as amended, Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-103, §1, at 258.
FLA. CONsT. art. X, §4(c) provides that if a homestead owner is incompetent, the legislature shall provide the method of conveyance or encumbrance. Moreover, FLA. STAT.
§747.01 (1) (1969) provides that a person missing in action is considered an absentee. Thus,
where an absentee has not supplied his wife or next of kin with an "adequate" power
of attorney, such persons may apply to the circuit court for an order authorizing a transfer
of the absentee's property. Fla. Stat. §§747.021, .022 (1969), as amended, Fla. Laws 1971,
ch. 71-103, §§3, 4, at 258-61.
92. FLA. STAT. §709.015 (1) (Supp. 1970).
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following the first official report or listing of the principal as missing or
missing in action." 93
Since section 709.015 mentions only the method by which a power of
attorney may be used to convey homestead without any provision for
specifically allowing such a conveyance, the legislature apparently presumed that such a conveyance was valid when it enacted this section. This
presumption appears correct because this type of transfer was never explicitly prohibited. Thus, chapter 71-27, Laws of Florida, authorizing a deed
of homestead by a power of attorney, may be substantive surplusage enacted
only as a practical matter to satisfy the groundless but yet real beliefs of
94
Florida title insurers and attorneys that such transfers were invalid.
Creation of Tenancy by the Entirety
The 1968 constitution clearly provides that the owner of homestead
"may by deed transfer the title to an estate by the entirety with the spouse. '9 '
Since the homesteader may make such a conveyance, the necessary mechanics
of such a transfer remain to be determined. 96
At common law an interspousal conveyance was legally impossible, since
97
it constituted an admission that the wife had an independent existence.
The normal method for making such a conveyance was for the spouse holding title to convey to a third person or "strawman" who in turn reconveyed

93. FLA. STAT. §709.015 (4) (Supp. 1970). Section (2) provides: "If the exercise of the
power of attorney requires the execution and delivery of a recordable instrument, the
power of attorney shall be executed with the same formalities as required of the instrument itself and recorded pursuant to the laws of Florida." This section raises the question
of what the legislature means by the word "formalities." Since a deed of homestead must
be executed by both husband and wife, does it mean that a power of attorney for one
spouse must be executed by both to convey the homestead? While such joinder would
certainly seem like an idle act, it could be required by a strict construction of the statute.
Another unanswered question is whether a wife, holding a power of attorney from her
husband who owns the homestead in fee simple rather than as a tenant by the entirety,
must wait one year after receiving a report of "missing" or "missing in action."
94. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 34, at 1-2. A further problem confronts the title
examiner in relation to powers of attorney. As a general rule the examiner cannot make a
determination from the public records whether an instrument, for example a deed, involves homestead property. CO.IMISSION REPORT, supra note 34, at 2. If such a link is found
the vendee may not be willing to accept a deed. If the vendee does accept the deed the
consideration may be greatly reduced because of the unwillingness of a title insurance
company to issue a policy. LAWYFRS' TrrE GUARANTY FUND, TITLE NoTEs 193-58 (1958);
LAWYERS' TITLE GUARANTY FUND, TITLE NOTES 505-64 (1964). Thus, such factors furnish
additional public policy considerations for holding Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-27 constitutional.
95. FLA. CoNsT. art. X, §4 (c).
96. The question can be reduced further to an inquiry as to who should be the
named grantee and what interest should be conveyed. For a discussion of this problem
under the 1885 constitution see Starling, The Tenancy by the Entireties in Florida, 16 U.
FLA. L. REv. 111 (1961); Note, Estates by the Entirety: Creation Between Husband and
Wife, 1 U. FLA. L. Rav. 433 (1948).
97. If the husband joined in the wife's conveyance to himself it was said to be void,
since he could not convey to himself. R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §622 (1964).
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to both husband and wife.9s These circuitous conveyances enabled the parties
to avoid the common law rule that a grantor could not convey to himself.
Surprisingly, the question of whether an estate by the entirety existed in
Florida did not reach the supreme court until 1913 in the case of English v.
English.99 In that case a husband holding fee simple title conveyed to a
strawman who reconveyed to the husband and his wife. After pointing out
that the estate by the entirety existed at common law the court held that,
since this state adopted the common law except as modified by statute,100
the estate existed in Florida. 10' Furthermore, the court indicated that when
a conveyance is made to husband and wife, a tenancy by 'the entirety is
10 2
created unless a contrary intent is shown.
In 1947 the Florida Legislature amended section 689.11 to provide: "An
estate by the entirety may be created by the spouse holding fee simple title
conveying to the other by a deed in which the purpose to create such estate
is stated."' 03 This amendment impliedly abolished the concept of the common law unities 04 and thus removed the requirement of a strawman in an

98.

3 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws

§182 (1935);

J.

WILLIAMS & R. EASrVOOD,

REAL PROPERTY 445 (1933).
99. 66 Fla. 427, 63 So. 822 (1913).
100. FLA. STAT. §2.01 (1969).
101. 66 Fla. 427, 431, 63 So. 822, 823 (1913). The court indicated that upon the death
of one spouse the survivor takes the complete estate, although not a new estate; both
spouses must assent to alienation of the estate; and there can be no severance by the act
of either and no partition during their joint lives. Id. Accord, Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303,
103 So. 833 (1925).
102. 66 Fla. 427, 430-31, 63 So. 822, 823. Accord, Kollar v. Kollar, 155 Fla. 705, 21 So.
2d 356 (1945); Knapp v. Frederickson, 148 Fla. 311, 4 So. 2d 251 (1941); Dixon v. Becker,
134 Fla. 547, 184 So. 114 (1938); Ohio Butterine Co. v. Hargrave, 79 Fla. 458, 84 So. 376
(1920). Cf. American Cent. Ins. Co. v. 'Whitlock, 122 Fla. 363, 165 So. 380 (1936). Although
this was a case dealing with personal property, the court noted that to "create a tenancy by
the entireties, it is not necessary that the grantees be described as husband and wife or
their marital relation referred to." Id. at 365-66, 165 So. at 381.
103. Fla. Laws 1947, ch. 23964, §1, at 730-31.
104. The necessary "unities" to form an estate by the entirety were expressed in
Andrews v. Andrews, 155 Fla. 654, 21 So. 2d 205 (1945). The court said the only distinguishing feature of an estate in common is the unity of possession by the co-tenants.
A joint tenancy, however, contemplates the three additional unities of interest, title, and
time. In other words, the tenants must each have the same interest that was created at the
same time in the same conveyance. An estate by the entirety contemplates the additional
unity of person. At common law husband and wife were considered one person and thus
an estate by the entirety could not be created pursuant to a bigamous marriage. Stanley v.
Powers, 123 Fla. 359, 166 So. 843 (1936). A severe attack on the requirement of the common
law unities was leveled in Johnson v. Landefeld, 138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939), where the
husband conveyed non-homestead property to himself and his wife as tenants by the entirety. An evenly divided court affirmed the lower court decree upholding the deed notwithstanding the absence of a strawman transfer. A vigorous dissent explicitly rejected the
majority's statement that all the requisites of time, title, interest, possession, and person
had been met. See Note, supra note 96. But see LaPierre v. Kalergis, 257 So. 2d 33 (Fla.
1971, aff'g in part 251 So. 2d 885 (Ist D;CA. Fla. 1971), where the court stated that the
common law unities were still required for a joint tenancy.
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interspousal conveyance creating a tenancy by the entirety10 s Since the
statute required a statement of purpose, the amendment failed to allow the
most common method of creation-a simple conveyance by the husband to
6
himself and his wife.10

In Schuler v. Claughton107 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held valid a conveyance where a husband transferred title to
the property to himself and his wife as tenants by the entirety without
stating this purpose. Section 689.11 apparently disallowed such a conveyance
because of the omission of the express statement of purpose. 0 8 Nevertheless,
the court held that a deed from a husband to himself and his wife sufficiently
implied such a purpose. 0 9 Furthermore, the court saw no reason to invalidate
the deed, since a transfer from a third person to the parties would have
created a tenancy by the entirety.11 °
To remedy this trap for the unwary the 1971 Florida Legislature amended section 689.11 to provide:"' "An estate by the entirety may be created
by the action of the spouse holding title: (a) Conveying to the other by a
deed in which the purpose to create the estate is stated; or (b) Conveying to
both spouses."
Since this statute has also been amended to include homestead" 2 the
provision in the 1968 constitution, allowing a husband to create a homestead tenancy by the entirety with his wife, 13 should be interpreted in light
of such statutory provision. Formerly, such a conveyance was required
to be to the wife stating the purpose of the transfer. Now a conveyance
should be possible by the husband, without the joinder of his wife, to: (1)

105. Hunt v. Covington, 145 Fla. 706, 200 So. 76 (1941); Snow v. Mathews, 190 So. 2d
50 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1966).

106. There appear to be several alternatives that a grantor may use: (I) convey,
stating the purpose, in fee simple to his wife; (2) convey an undivided interest to his wife;
or (3) convey in fee simple to himself and his wife. All three appear to be within the
spirit if not the letter of the statute. The types of difficulties that can arise are illustrated
by the case of Little River Bank & Trust Co. v. Eastman, 105 So. 2d 912 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1958). In this case the husband owned some lots in fee simple, which he wished to transfer
to himself and his wife as tenants by the entirety. He conveyed an undivided one-half
interest in the lots with right of survivorship to his wife, stating in the deed that the conveyance was to create an estate by the entirety. The court rejected the contention that this
conveyance created an estate by the entirety only in a one-half interest of the property,
finding instead that the husband and wife were tenants in common with right of survivorship.
FLA. STAT. §689.15 (1969) abolishes the right of survivorship unless it is expressly provided
for in the deed. The court, however, found the statement that the deed was to create an
estate by the entireties sufficient indication of survivorship. 105 So. 2d at 913.
107. 248 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1957).
108. Fla. Stat. §689.11 (1) (1969), amended by Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-54, at 156-57.
109. Schuler v. Claughton, 248 F.2d 528, 530 (5th Cir. 1957).
110. Id. at 529.
111. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-54, at 156-57, amending Fla. Stat. §689.11 (1969)
added).
112. Id. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.

(emphasis

113. FLA. CONST. art. X, §4(c). Property held as an estate by entirety may constitute
homestead. Menendez v. Rodriguez, 106 Fla. 214, 143 So. 223 (1932).
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his wife, stating the purpose of the deed is to create a tenancy by the entirety or (2) himself and his wife as tenants by the entirety."14
Conveyance Where One Spouse Is Incompetent
The 1968 Florida constitution provides: "If the owner or spouse is incompetent, the method of alienation or encumbrance shall be as provided
by law.""25 This is a new section, since the 1885 constitution contained no
provision with reference to an alienation of the homestead in such circumstances.
The general rule is that if there has been no adjudication of mental
incompetency the grantor is presumed to be sane and mentally capable
of conveying a valid deed. 116 Therefore, the burden is on the one attacking
the transaction to show mental incompetency.1' A person adjudicated insane
is presumed to be incompetent until mental capacity is restored; however,
this presumption is rebuttable."18
Deeds executed by insane or mentally deficient persons are merely voidable and not void so long as the grantor is not under guardianship."19 This
rule also applies where the land is homestead. 20 Furthermore, it is generally
held that the insanity of one spouse does not dispense with the necessity of
joinder in the alienation of homestead.' 2' Under the old constitution's requirement that homestead be conveyed with the joint consent of the husband and wife,12 2 the sane spouse was placed in a difficult position if the
other spouse became insane and was under guardianship. Since a deed

114. Cf. Hunt v. Covington, 145 Fla. 706, 200 So. 76 (1941).
115. FLA. CONsr.art. X, §4(c).
116. Wise v. Wise, 134 Fla. 555, 184 So. 91 (1938).
117. Id.
118. F"A. STAT. §394.22 (10) (a) (1969) provides: "After the judgment adjudicating a
person to be mentally incompetent is filed in the office of the county judge, such person
shall be presumed to be incapable, for the duration of such incompetency, of managing his
own affairs or of making any gift, contract, or any instrument in writing which is binding
on him or his estate. The filing of said judgment shall be notice of such incapacity." In
Hassey v. Williams, 127 Fla. 734, 174 So. 9 (1937), the grantor of a deed of homestead had
spent one year in a mental institution and never had been restored to competency. During
fifteen years between her confinement and the conveyance in question, she had married
and generally conducted business transactions. There was no evidence of an unsound mind.
The court, in upholding the transaction, laid down a general rule regarding such transfers: "This court is committed to rule that mere mental weakness will not authorize a
court of equity to set aside a deed if such weakness does not amount to inability to
comprehend the effect and nature of the transaction and is not accompanied by evidence
of imposition or undue influence. The presumption always supports the validity of the
deed and the sanity of the grantor until overcome by a preponderance of the evidence."
Id. at 738, 174 So. at 11.
119. Hartnett v. Lutauro, 82 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1955); Sheppard v. Cherry, 118 Fla. 473,
159 So. 661 (1935); Hassey v. Williams, 127 Fla. 734, 174 So. 2d 9 (1937).
120. Hassey v. Williams, 127 Fla. 734, 174 So. 2d 9 (1937).
121. E.g., Stokes v. Whidden, 97 Fla. 1057, 122 So. 566 (1929).
122. FLA. CONST. art. X, §1 (1885).
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executed by such an incompetent spouse was void,123 and not merely voidable, the only alternative was to have the guardian execute the deed. Before
enactment of the 1968 constitution, however, the guardian had no such
24
power.
As a general rule when there is no exception in the constitution a conveyance of the homestead where one spouse is incompetent, the courts
cannot imply such an exception .1 2 5 This is further reinforced by Florida
Statutes, section 745.15, which grants guardians the authority to make conveyances for an incompetent ward. 26 However, the statute originally included a provision that expressly excluded homestead from its application.2 The 1968 constitution allows a guardian to convey homestead property
for an incompetent spouse; however, the provision indicates that the method
shall be as prescribed by law. 28 Thus, immediately after passage of the 1968
constitution such a conveyance was still prohibited, since the homestead
exclusion of 745.15 was in force. However, subsection (1) of section 745.15
was later amended to include homestead. 129 This section now provides for
the conveyance of homestead by the guardian of a legal incompetent when
0
the guardian petitions the court and receives an order to that effect.' 3 In ad3
dition, subsection (6) of section 745.15 was repealed' ' so the section no
longer excludes homestead. Thus, the rules concerning conveyances of
homestead have not been changed when the mental incompetent is without
a guardian. However, a convenient method is now provided for a transfer
where the incompetent is under guardianship.
SUMMARY

The constitution of 1885 imposed certain express restraints on the inter
vivos alienation of homestead property, which required the joint consent
123. In Stanley v. Campbell, 157 Fla. 891, 27 So. 2d 411 (1946), the grantor had been
twice adjudicated insane prior to his conveyance and also was under guardianship. The
transfer was made without a restoration of competency. Moreover, subsequent to the conveyance, he was again adjudicated insane. The court held the deed void. Accord, Doris v.
McFarland, 113 Conn. 594, 146 A. 52 (1931). One reason given for this distinction is
that the insane person under guardianship has no control over the property, since it is
controlled by the guardian; while the insane person not under guardianship still has
control over his property. R. PATTON & C. PATTON, TiTLEs 120 (2d ed. 1957). LAWYERS'
TITLE GUARANTY FUND, TITLE NoTEs 111-58 (1958) takes the position that deeds by a person
adjudicated mentally incompetent are void, without distinguishing whether a guardian is
appointed. This seems to preclude the possibility of lucid intervals.
124. In Skokes v. Whidden, 97 Fla. 1057, 122 So. 566 (1924), a husband was adjudicated
insane and his wife appointed his guardian. The court held that the appointment of the
wife as guardian did not authorize her to convey title to the homestead.
125. E.g., Thompson v. New England Mortgage Sec. Co., 110 Ala. 400, 405-07, 18 So.
315, 316-17 (1895).
126. FLA. STAT. §745.15 (1) (1969), amended by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-45, at 153.
127. See FLA. STAT. §745.15 (6) (1969), repealed by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-45, at 153.
128. FLA. CONsT. art. X, §4(c).
129. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-45, at 153.
130. FLA. STAT. §745.15 (1) (Supp. 1970).
131. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-45, at 153.
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and due execution of both spouses. In addition, Florida courts imposed a
restraint that required valuable consideration when the homestead was conveyed to a family member. This requirement was abolished by the 1968
constitution.
Furthermore, the Florida supreme court strictly interpreted the old
constitution to require the wife's joinder when she was the grantee of an
interspousal conveyance of homestead. This requirement resulted from a
misunderstanding of the constitutional clause that homestead exemptions
shall inure to the homesteader's heirs at his death. A Florida statute now
allows interspousal conveyances without the joinder of the grantee spouse.
Arguments that this statute is unconstitutional do not appear to have a
sound legal basis. Moreover, most states have abolished such a requirement,
realizing that it serves no purpose and would merely require an idle
act. The new constitution also allows for the creation of a homestead
tenancy by the entirety by the owner and his wife. In addition, a new statute
spells out the proper method for such a conveyance.
Although the new constitution does not specifically allow a conveyance
of the homestead by a power of attorney, a Florida statute now permits such
transfers. Some authorities have suggested this statute might be unconstitutional, but such contentions have no legal substance. Moreover, for public
policy reasons, this type of transfer should be upheld because of increasing
societal mobility and the absence caused by military service and old age.
Prior to the 1968 constitution a homestead conveyance by an incompetent
spouse under guardianship was void. The new constitution, however, permits
such conveyances as provided by statute. In this regard the legislature has
recently authorized a conveyance by the guardian with court approval. This
removes the unduly harsh restraint previously imposed on a sane spouse.
RECOMNIENDED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDiMiENT

Past judicial approaches to constitutional restraints of homestead alienation gave terms such as "duly executed" the sacrosanct connotation usually
associated with terms such as "due process." Provisions controlling both the
inter vivos and testamentary alienation of homestead should be removed from
the constitution. There is no reason why the legislature could not statutorily provide the necessary controls. This would add greater certainty to
the law governing homestead alienation by eliminating the need for continual constitutional interpretation to reconcile its provisions with legislative enactments. Accordingly, a recommended constitutional amendment
1 32
is posed in Appendix A.
This amendment would authorize the legislature to control restraints
on the inter vivos and testamentary alienation of homestead, but would
not alter the constitutional provision for the exemption from forced sale.
In this manner homesteaders would be afforded all the basic protection of

132. This amendment has been recommended
Florida Law Revision Commission. See CoMMISSION
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the exemption but would not be required to make constitutional interpretations in order to alienate their property.
CONCLUSION

In Florida, homesteads are still "sacred cows." Previously, courts have
performed "judicial gymnastics" to protect the homesteader and his children
from various types of alienations, many of which the homesteader himself
sought to uphold. Any attempt by the legislature to change the course of
the decisions was held inapplicable to homestead property or unconstitutional in its application.
Hopefully, with the enactment of the new constitution and the subsequent legislative provisions, additional certainty now exists in Florida
homestead law. Notwithstanding these revolutionary changes the final step
must be taken by incorporating the constitutional amendment posed in
Appendix A. Such an amendment, when coupled with existing legislative
provisions, would greatly enhance the marketability and stability of land
titles in Florida.
FREDERICK

M.

DAHLMEIER

APPENDIX A
The following is a recommended constitutional amendment to article X, section 4 (c), of
the Florida constitution:
(c) The homestead may be alienated, encumbered, devised, or inherited in the
same manner as other real property unless otherwise provided by law.
APPENDIX B
In lieu of the constitutional amendment posed in Appendix A, the statutes governing the
testamentary alienation of homestead should be amended to conform with the corresponding
constitutional provisions (see note 34 supra). Accordingly, the following are recommended
statutory amendments to sections 731.05 and 731.27. These proposed amendments afford
equal treatment to both sexes. In addition, they provide that the homestead shall descend
as other property (the surviving spouse takes a child's part) unless the surviving spouse
elects to take a life estate.
Section 731.05-Any property may be disposed of by will, except a homestead
when its devise is prohibited by the state constitution, in which event it shall descend
as provided by law.
Section 731.27 - If the devise of a homestead is prohibited by the state constitution,
it shall descend according to the law of intestate succession. The surviving spouse
of a homestead owner, either personally or through a guardian, if the spouse is
under a disability, may elect to take a life estate in the homestead in addition to an
intestate share. The election shall not be effective unless made in writing and recorded by the clerk of the circuit court of the county in which the homestead is
located, within six (6) months after the death of the homestead owner.
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